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relevant theory has varied over time and across researchers, especially in Macroeconomics. These issues affect the logic and 
significance of analytical procedures for treating expectations, and seem particularly pertinent when studying crises.
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1 Introduction
For several decades already, the Rational Expectations (RE) notion has been at the center of
macroeconomic analysis. In its concrete applications, RE has been generally identied with the
coincidence between the anticipations that a model attributes to the agents and those that would
be generated by the same current model. The literature has certainly explored alternatives,
such as expectations based on various statistical learning schemes, behavior incorporating model
uncertainty, or simple heuristics such as extrapolative expectations (De Long, Shleifer, Summers
& Waldmann, 1990; Sargent, 1993; Hansen & Sargent, 2000; Choi & Mertens, 2006; Lansing,
2006; Evans & Honkapohja, 2001; Barberis, Greenwood, Jin & Shleifer, 2016). However, RE in
its typical form has retained its prominence as a presumed sign of rigorous reasoning (almost to
the point of embodying a methodological precept), and as the default option in macro modeling,
against which other possible representations of agentsforecasts are charged with a heavy burden
of proof.
In this article, we shall not be concerned particularly with the practical pertinence of RE for
the study of macro phenomena (for a discussion focused on crises see, for example, Heymann
and Leijonhufvud (2014)), or with its usefulness as a practical heuristic device. Rather, we
concentrate on the logic of RE as an analytical construct. We will indicate (Section 2) that, as
commonly understood in Macroeconomics, RE is an ambiguous, ill-dened concept, which, when
given a specic denition, varies between (i) the statement that the probability distributions
of the outcomes anticipated by agents equal the objective distributions characterizing in fact
those outcomes1 and (ii) the idea that the expectations of agents incorporate at each moment
the knowledge derived from economic analysis. We shall then propose (Sections 3-6) that the
usual practice of RE modeling implements neither one of those denitions and, consequently,
can hardly be given a precise interpretation.
The argument leading to that conclusion is quite unsophisticated, and follows directly from
the straightforward recognition that economic analysis is an ongoing activity, so that its prac-
titioners, who are continuously and consciously engaged in rening, extending, or revising their
understanding of the economy, should naturally recognize that (i) their constructs do not possess
the status of true modelsof the system of interest, and that (ii) those provisional analytical
objects have been evolving and will continue to evolve. Failure to incorporate these obvious
facts has implied that the presumed implementation of the notion that expectations are correct
in probabilities has confused the model that the analyst tentatively posits at present with the
generator of objectively correct expectations. When invoking the meaning of RE as consistency
with the relevant theory, the usual practice has brought about an unwarranted assimilation of
the current model, which corresponds to the analysts state of knowledge at this date, with the
engine for making forecasts that the agents have used in the past and will use in the future.
We will suggest that these problems are not simply a matter of analytical esthetics, but
they have concrete consequences for the assessment of the signicance and consistency of the
respective models. By the self-referential nature of the object of study, the economist tries to
understand and to represent social outcomes generated by the behavior of agents who are also
in the business of making practical sense of the same system. Thus, the job of the researcher
has intrinsically an aspect of applied epistemology. This calls for a reection on the feature,
the dynamics and the possible real- world implications of the analytical work itself. If the time
varying and fallible nature of the representations built by economists is explicitly taken into
account, model consistent expectations could then be viewed as those based on analytical
schemes prevalent or inuential when the anticipations are made. From an applied point of
1Also expressed as PLM = ALM : the perceived law of motion is identical with the actual law of motion
governing the performance of the system.
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view, the argument may be especially relevant for the study of debt crises, characterized by
a widespread sense of discomfort with previous representations of the economy and an active
search for lessons from the experience among both agents and analysts.
2 Rational Expectations: An Ambiguous Notion
In the celebrated work that introduced the RE framework, Muth (1961) expresses the concept
by the statement:
. . . expectations of rms (or more generally, the subjective probability distribution of
outcomes) tend to be distributed, for the same information set, about the prediction
of the theory (or the objectiveprobability distribution of outcomes).
That explanation has substantive content, much more than the vague pronouncements often
encountered, such as agents make no systematic mistakes. However, an ambiguity is present in
the parenthetical observation: the objective distribution cannot be equated automatically with
the prediction of the theory. The distinction between the two meanings would be particularly
relevant in Macroeconomics, a eld where the search for appropriate representations seems far
from having converged. One way of trying to avoid the duality of meaning is by conating the
three perspectives of the analyst, the agent, and the real world evolution of the system:
A rational expectations equilibrium is a xed point of this mapping (from per-
ceived law of motion to actual law of motion). From a practical perspective, an
important property of a rational expectations model is that it imposes a communism
of models and expectations. If we dene a model as a probability distribution over
a sequence of outcomes, possibly indexed by a parameter vector, a rational expecta-
tions equilibrium asserts that the same model is shared by (1) all of the agents within
the model, (2) the econometrician estimating the model, and (3) nature, also known
as the data generating mechanism. Di¤erent agents might have di¤erent informa-
tion, but they form forecasts by computing conditional expectations with respect to
a common joint density, that is, a common model.(Sargent T., 2008, p. 878)
However, the identity between the forecast produced by the economists model and that
which would result from the actual law of motion can only be sustained if the model is as-
sumed to generate strictly optimal predictions (in probability), not subject to any improvement.
But this contradicts the obvious fact that economic theories and models concerning a given set
of phenomena vary substantially over time (as they may also do across researchers). There-
fore, the two potential concepts (prediction of theoryand objective distribution) must be
distinguished to accommodate the fact that theories do change over time.2
In what follows we shall stress the di¤erence between the (current) model built by the
economist and the model that would produce outcomes matching the actual data generating
processes. Accordingly, we shall deal with two separate concepts of Rational Expectations:
RE1, representing the equivalence between the stochastic law of motion of the system of interest
as perceived by agents and the actual law of motion, and RE2, denoting the correspondence of
the forecasts generated by agents with those that the economist would derive from her model.
2As Daniel Aromi has remarked to us, one could argue that what may seem a change in knowledgewhich
implies a revision of previous beliefs and modes of analysis does not introduce in fact an actual novelty, but results
in fact from an existing meta scheme, which dictates a re specication of the existing model as new information
arrives. However, what an analyst as such does know is embodied in explicit arguments (the agent, by contrast,
may rely on tacit perspicacity). If the presumptive model choosing device does not have an open accessible
expression, there is e¤ectively no such grand analytical tool.
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So as to permit a discussion of policy issues like the Lucas critique, we will distinguish between
the expectations of the government and those formed by the private sector (taken as a whole: in
order to focus the argument, we will abstract away matters regarding second and higher order
expectations within those sets of agents). Thus, RE1.1 will denote the case where both policy
makers and private individuals base their expectations on the ALM (actual law of motion of the
system), while RE1.2 indicates that the private sector acts as if it was aware of the ALM ; while
the government projects future conditions using the (fallible) model of the analyst; similarly
with RE2.1 (private sector: model consistent expectations, government: PLM = ALM) and
RE2.2 (both model consistent).3
3 General Setup
The actual evolution of the system is specied as a function of the realized history and the
looking ahead behavior of agents (private and public). This behavior is determined by decision
rules predicated on the systems history and on the probability distribution of the future values
of the variables of interest, as perceived by the agents when the expectations are formed. The
economy is also potentially hit by random shocks: these have the nature of intrinsically stochastic
exogenous impulses. That is:
Y t
0
= F

Y(t 1)0 ;H
P

Y(t 1)0 ; 
eP
(t 1)

Y t
0
;HG

Y(t 1)0 ; 
eG
(t 1)

Y t
0
; Zt
0
(3.1)
Where:
 Y is the vector of relevant variables; Yt its value at t.
 Y t0 indicates the systems current and future states: Y t0 = [Yt; :::; Yt+j ; :::].
 Y(t 1)0 denotes the history of the system up to t  1.
 F is the function that species the current state and the random future path of the system
as a consequence of the past history, the behavior of agents and the sequence of present
and future shocks.
 H summarizes the decision rules of agents (P andG), which determine behavior as function
of the observed history of the system and the anticipated distribution of the state4. For
the sake of the argument, H will be interpreted in the usual way, as the result of an overall
optimization on the part of agents.
  denotes a probability distribution; eit is a perceived distribution that embodies the
expectations of agent i (P;G) at t.
 Zt0 is the (random) sequence of present and future actually exogenous external shocks (in
contrast with error termsrepresenting measures of ignorancefor agents).
3Since the discussion concentrates on the specication of RE notions, we exclude from the analysis the general
case where the working schemes of reasoning that guide the anticipations of the agents are imperfect, and also
di¤er from the forecasts produced by the economists model.
4These actual behavior- inducing functions are given, and xed over time, although the history- dependence
embodied in H can lead to changes of the reduced expression of the decision rule as a reaction function.
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The probabilistic actual law of motion will then be given by:
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In this setting, agents, private and public, will be assumed to behave as if they followed
expectations given by:
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Where:
  indicates a probability distribution; ei(t 1)

Y t
0

is the probability of future events per-
ceived by agent i(i = P;G) at time t  1.
 Fi;t is the representation used by agent i at t of the function that denes the evolution
of the system given past history, the behavior rules of agents and their expectations, and
random shocks.
 HPi;(t 1) denotes the decision function of sector P as perceived by i at t   1. The private
sector is assumed to be homogenous, in actuality and perception, so that for all t HPP;t =
HP : the private agent understands his own behavior and the aggregate implications of
that of his peers (likewise with G : HGG;t = H
G).


ej(t 1)

Y t
0

i;(t 1)
is the perception of agent i at t 1 of the expectations formed at t 1
by the agents belonging to group j.
 Zt0i;(t 1) is the representation that i makes at t 1 of the process generating the sequence of
random (from the viewpoint of the agent) impulses on the system; these perceived shocks
may be di¤erent from the truly exogenous disturbances which e¤ectively inuence the
actual motion of the system.
Similarly, the economist, as an outside observer, would form anticipations on the basis of a
dated model, M; (t  1):
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The previous formulations raise questions about high order beliefs, including those that
refer to what an individual (agent or analyst) thinks about the future evolution of her own
conceptual and practical expectation building apparatus. We simplify our discussion by the
assumption that the expectations of sector P are common knowledge for its members, and that
G can be treated as a single agent. The time varying nature of the schemes that people use to
form anticipations in a learning environment will have to be addressed when dealing with model
consistent expectations.
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4 Fully knowledgeable economic agents: RE1.1
Under this assumption, agents behave as if they knew the actual law of motion of the relevant
variables. We will work here with the case where the condition is presumed to hold for the whole
set of economic actors, private and public (RE1.1). This means that, in practice, they have in-
ternalized in full the systematic elements of the systems dynamics; from their perspective, the
randomness of the future path of the economy is limited to objectively stochastic shocks5, irre-
ducible by any potential accumulation of experiences or learning e¤orts. The working knowledge
of private agents includes, in particular, the history contingent decision rules of the government;
the government, in turn knows as much as can be known about the present and future behavior
patterns of the private sector.
In this case, as noted in the literature, the systems performance can be described as a xed
point equilibrium, where the law of motion perceived by the agents coincides with the actual
law of motion generated by their behavior given those expectations:

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Where 

Y t
0

indicates the actual and perceived (by agents) probability distribution of
future events.
Some direct implications of RE1.1 as a maintained hypothesis are:
 Irrelevance of multiple equilibria:
The xed point equation (4.1) can admit as solutions multiple distributions for given fun-
damentals(functions F , H, and truly exogenous shocks Z). This opens the possibility of
economy wide coordination e¤ects which may condition the laws of motion of the system,
and make its evolution dependent on random variables (sunspots) that signal the way in
which those coordination e¤ects will operate. But this does not imply any indeterminacy,
or allows unexplained (for the agents) jumps in the behavior of the economy. Under RE1.1,
the assumption that agents behave as if they knew the true law of motion entails that,
for practical purposes, the coordination game has been played at the beginning of time,
including the choice of sunspots, and the agreed upon response to their realizations. Op-
erationally, sunspots are as much a part of the set of external impulses as the fundamental
shocks, and their generating processes and impacts on the economy are perfectly known
for both sets of variables. Therefore, in fact, there is a single, pre-determined contingent
path that the agents both know and generate by their behavior.
 No regrets, no possible learning for agents:
If the behavior functions H generate truly optimal contingent decisions, and agents have,
and know they have, fully correct probabilistic expectations, no event can cause concrete
regrets to economic actors, in the sense of retrospective desires of having acted di¤erently
in the past given the circumstances and the information available when the behavior was
chosen. With RE1.1, agents may subjectively feel sorry for bad luck in the realization
of external shocks (sunspots included), but would certainly stick to their original history-
dependent plans and expectations, and would not engage in the useless task of trying to
improve their already as if perfect knowledge of the economy. There can be no search for
lessons by economic actors after what looks as an economic crash: under RE1.1 this cannot
5For the sake of the discussion, one may as well suppose that agents are informed with innite precision of the
past histories of the relevant variables and make no rounding errors in their as if computations, so that they
need not be concerned with chaotic deterministic dynamics.
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have been other than the perfectly understood, unavoidable consequence of a well identied
outside shock whose likelihood the agents have always taken into account correctly.
 Practical immateriality of economic analysis:
The perfect knowledge of economic actors with RE1.1 operates under the as if umbrella: it
refers to the determination of actual behavior, and not necessarily to the coherent expres-
sion of arguments and well formulated beliefs. Economic analysts could then perform a
culturally worthy intellectual activity by building conceptual structures that try to provide
explicit, coherent approximate representations of what the agents do and know. But, in
the RE1.1 world, economists are working for no practical purpose: what they may have
to say can have no bearing on the determination of actual expectations or behavior.
 E¢ cient markets, debt sustainability by assumption:
Under RE1.1, every trader decides as if aware of the asset price generating process. Infor-
mation may be costly to obtain, and agents can (optimally) decide which data to gather
and which to leave unobserved (as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1976)). But, given those con-
straints, the practical knowledge that drives the agents information processing activity
is presumed to be as perfect as possible. Therefore, no individual can improve the out-
come of her market participation. In addition, debt sustainability holds without question:
formal default may well occur, but assets are valued on the basis of correct state contin-
gent expectations of repayment and the corresponding probabilities of occurrence, so that
outcomes at each state realize the implicit understanding of the parties when dening the
debt contract (Guzman & Heymann, 2015).
 Irrelevance of the Lucas Critique:
In practice, private agents are apt to change their behavioral responses to observables
according to the state of expectations, including particularly anticipations about the course
of government policies. If some news do modify existing perceptions about how policies will
be determined in the future, this can be expected to feed into the current decision patterns
of agents. That e¤ect only requires that agents be aware of information about a switch
in the governments behavior patterns, without restricting expectations to a particular
form or degree of accuracy. However, the usual discussions on the issue are based on a
particular scenario where, before a certain date, agents condently expect the constancy
of the prevailing reaction functions that determine the sequence of policy instruments and
have adapted well their behavior to that belief; these expectations are suddenly disrupted
by the rare event of a zero ex ante probability regime change, after which agents redene
their decision rules presuming that the new policy scheme will be permanent.
That argument conicts with the RE1.1 assumption. Under RE1.1, the expectations of
agents incorporate the full dynamics of the behavior of others. Here, the very notion of
a regime shift becomes questionable. If the government changes an elementary reaction
function, it is either the result of a current fundamentally random shock (which can only
happen as a realization of a variable with a known probability distribution belonging to
the set of variables Z that agents have always taken into consideration), or it is motivated
as part of the overall governments history dependent decision rule (implementing a meta
regime, say); in both cases, it cannot be taken as an arbitrary act of at, and the future
evolution of policies will be perceived by private agents in accordance to their correct
knowledge of the process that generates the governments behavior. In turn, a RE1.1
government understands all that, and has determined its actions in the past, and will
continue to do so in the future, with a precise recognition of the response that they will
elicit: a supercial change in some shallowparameter will not disrupt those plans, based
as they are on encompassing knowledge.
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In any case, the RE1.1 assumption itself is not implemented in usual practice. An economist
who wishes to work strictly within the RE1.1 framework must represent the behavior of agents
whose practical knowledge about the economy is superior to that embodied in the models that
the analyst has built in the past and, realistically, will produce in the future. Therefore, the use
of model consistent schemes to generate expectations contradicts the RE1.1 hypothesis.6 The
analyst should not attribute to the agents expectations based on the probability distributions
generated by the model. The uncertainty perceived by the model builder as such, in possession
of his analytical constructs, fallible and provisional as they are, and restricted to a limited range
of validity, will certainly be di¤erent from that of the RE1.1 agents.7
In summary, the analyst who maintains the RE1.1 criterion looks for a model of the type:
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Where, as before,  indicates the true probability distribution of future events, which by
assumption bases the expectations that guide the behavior of agents. As a consequence, under
the RE1.1 assumption, the model would produce the distribution:
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The notation, as above, indicates that FM;(t 1), HPM;(t 1), H
G
M;(t 1) and Z
t0
M;(t 1) are functions
and shocks pertaining to the modelM considered relevant by the analyst at time t 1. As part of
its specication, the model includes the provision that the expectations of private agents and the
government are generated by the true probability distribution 

Y t
0

. Thus, to be consistent
with its RE1.1 assumption, the model should incorporate a conjecture about how agents who
know more than the analyst may evaluate the future dynamics of the system. Instead, the usual
practice would look for a current model consistent xed point given by:
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The di¤erence between both expressions, (4.3) and (4.4), shows that using the model to
represent expectations misses the distinguishing characteristic of RE1.1 as the limit case where
agents have already obtained implicitly the knowledge that the analyst aspires to attain, and
make explicit, but not in the foreseeable future. Moreover, if expectations are somehow observ-
able, a rm belief in RE1 should make the economist adapt her theory to make it compatible
with the perceptions of agents, rather than trying to represent those perceptions using her a
priori preferred model.
6 If the analyst as an economic agent is part of the PLM = ALM collective, his tacit knowledge as a decision
maker should generate better anticipations than his explicitly formulated model. Consequently, the economist
who believes in RE1.1 should not rely on the model to guide his economic behavior.
7 It has been argued (Sargent, 2010) that macroeconomic models of the RBC or NK tradition built before the
crisis of the years 2000 were designed to work under normal economic conditions, not during nancial disruptions or
economic breakdowns. But if it is understood that those constructs leave relevant phenomena out of consideration,
it cannot be said that the model generated expectations are rational, because agents would be ignoring the relevant
fact of the incomplete validity of the model. RE1.1 agents would contemplate the chances of crises and breakdowns
with their true probabilities, so that the representation of the normal times itself would have to be di¤erent from
that produced under the assumption of model-based expectations.
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A simple example may serve to illustrate these points. Consider an economist who studies
a certain asset market on the basis of a Lucas (1978) tree model. Dividends on the asset are
actually generated by a process: dt = d + f(xt 1) + "t. The function f(xt 1) is fundamentally
deterministic, and its argument xt 1 is publicly observable at t  1. The term "t denotes a truly
stochastic shock, which represents rare, low-probability tail events (Barro, 2005; Chen, Dou
& Kogan, 2015). Assume that the analyst understands that f(xt 1) is non-random, but has
not cracked the code of the generating function; and that, from her viewpoint (and that of
the agents who potentially follow her perspective) that term is readily described as a stochastic
impulse with a well dened distribution. Moreover, the data set available to the analyst does
not include any realization of the big shocks ", or evidence that they may sometime occur.
For the economist, then, the error term in the value of the dividend is dened simply by the
pseudo random variable f(xt 1).
Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that the economist can approximate well the observed
yields of the asset with a satisfactory theory using the observed distribution of the pseudo
random variable. These results may seem to validate the model, with no further questions to
pose. However, the conclusion would disregard an important piece of relevant information from
the perspective of the analyst, if the economist rmly believes that, for the RE1 agents, the
realizations of xt 1 are perfectly foreseeable, and do not constitute a risk factor. Therefore, in
order to rationalize market behavior, the researcher should reject her apparently plausible result,
and look for a hiddene¤ect (hidden for her, not the agents), which she has not observed, and
does not emerge from her contemporaneous theory.
5 Model consistency: RE2.2
The second notion of rational expectations (model consistency) would downgrade the quality
of agents expectations from the high planes of RE1 to the level of professional competence.
But professional standards and analytical constructs are not immutable. What does model
consistency of expectations then mean when applied to past or prospective behavior?
5.1 Universal (private and public) model-consistency: RE2.2
Now, agents are assumed to know what the analyst knows about the system, not more, not
less. However, this is not a strictly dened notion, since the preferred model of the analyst, as
an active worker, has changed over time, and can be expected to continue evolving. Typically,
macroeconomic models built under the rational expectations cover take the present model and
use it to generate expectations for all times. That is, for every  , the practice is to assume that:
M;(t 1)

Y 
0
= 
0@FM;(t 1)
0@ Y( 1)0 ;HPM;(t 1) Y( 1)0 ; M;(t 1) Y  0 ;
HGM;(t 1)

Y( 1)0 ; M;(t 1)

Y 
0

; Z
0
M;(t 1)
1A1A (5.1)
But, if  < t, at that time the analyst was holding, and applying to represent the expectations
of the agents populating the economy, a vintage  model:
M;( 1)

Y 
0
= 
0@FM;( 1)
0@ Y( 1)0 ;HPM;( 1) Y( 1)0 ; M;( 1) Y  0 ;
HGM;( 1)

Y( 1)0 ; M;( 1)

Y 
0

; Z
0
M;( 1)
1A1A (5.2)
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Therefore, if both conditions hold:
 When viewed from t, the expectations derived from the model built at  do not satisfy
rational expectations, contrary to the claim made at the time the older vintage model was
current.
 Since the model produced at t is presumably considered an improvement relative to past
models M , agents in the current model are assumed to have had at  superior knowledge
compared to the analyst: they are implicitly represented as beneting in advance from the
learning of the economist in the t   interval.
 Consequently, the model t consistent expectations for all times implement neither the
PLM = ALM criterion (as seen in the previous section), nor the correspondence of the
forecasts of agents with those resulting from the models in use at the time () when the
expectations were formed.
A conceivable criterion for implementing the RE.2 assumption on historical data could be to
combine the specication of the model currently proposed by the economist with expectations
drawn from the model in use at the time when the anticipations were made. Thus, the
economy at time t would be represented by an up to date scheme, but the forecasts imputed
to agents would correspond to the analytical schemes prevalent at  , when those anticipations
were worked out:
M;t;( 1)

Y 
0
= 
0@FM;t
0@ Y( 1)0 ;HPM;t Y( 1)0 ; M;( 1) Y  0 ;
HGM;t

Y( 1)0 ; M;( 1)

Y 
0

; Z
0
M;t
1A1A (5.3)
There, M;t;

Y 
0

indicates the probability distribution that the economist would generate
for the forward-looking sequence starting at a previous date  < t, assuming that the repre-
sentation of the functions (F;HP ;HG) corresponds to the latest vintage model M; t, but the
predictions of the agents made at  1 were based on the current model at that time,M; ( 1).
This formulation has special features. In particular, it presumes that expectations are au-
tomatically formed using the model held by the analyst at each date, as if the agents had
coordinated unanimously on that scheme, and relied on its applicability at all future periods.
This assumption may be questionable, since all actors concerned are, and should know they
are, in a learning environment (the model has replaced previous vintage constructs, and will be
superseded in the future), so that future expectations will be formed di¤erently than today. The
treatment of this point raises nontrivial questions. In any case, the use of dated descriptions
of beliefs about future economic conditions seems hardly avoidable in macroeconomic contexts,
where both theoretical constructs and popular frames of mind have shown substantial variability.
This form of model-consistency represents agents as people with provisional and fallible
expectations-forming instruments, far from the limit of RE1. Here, one need not rule out
costly knowledge failures like those that emerge in crises, where agents discover that their
information-processing tools have been inappropriate, and are impelled to engage in a search for
substitutes, with unclear outcomes.
The criterion places agents and analysts on a similar footing; however, it may be com-
patible with an asymmetric role of expert opinioninuencing the expectations and behavior
of agents, if the choice of the incumbent model M; t can be supposed to be driven mainly by
the evolution of some type of professional consensus. Such a scenario leaves room for real-
world e¤ects of economic analysis, particularly in the form of policy advice, although there
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would be no presumption that this advice is based on an accurate approximation of the actual
data-generating model.
In the RE2 setting, by assumption, the designated expert knows that the government shares
(or follows) her representation of the economy and is ready to apply its conclusions.8 But the
analyst recognizes that her incumbent model, which she is prepared to use for the evaluation
of policy alternatives, is also incorporated into the expectations of private agents. Does this
contemplate the (as if) capacity of those agents to second- guess the economist and anticipate
her recommendations? How will the private sector assess the potential durability of the newly
determined policies given that the reformulation is part of a recurrent process as the economist,
and the agents themselves, go about revising their working models? The implementation of
the general notion of model- consistent expectations would then lead to nontrivial questions
regarding the features of economic analysis for the purpose of macro policy design, and the
meaning and formulation of propositions akin to the Lucas critique.
6 Heterogeneous expectations types: RE1.2 and RE2.1
For completeness, we discuss briey the cases where one sector (P or G) is assumed to be
endowed with knowledge of the actual law of motion, while the other follows model-consistent
expectations.
6.1 RE1.2: Fully knowledgeable private sector, model-consistent government
In these conditions, private expectations would be given by the true distribution, taking into
account the correctly anticipated (in distribution) sequence of the future decision rules the gov-
ernment would choose, given the history of the system observed at the time and the expectations
generated by the model that the policymaker will be using. In order to implement type 1 ra-
tional expectations, the agent must, and does, form correct anticipations of the evolution of
the decision-making schemes employed by the government and the expectations that shall be
fed into them. In this sense, the private sector knows more about the thought- process of the
policymaker and the economist (who produces the model-consistent forecasts used by G) than
those players themselves. The analyst faces a problem analogous to that which appeared under
RE1.1, of modeling the beliefs and the behavior of agents with an implicit understanding of
the system superior to that of the observer; as a policy advisor, she must also factor into her
exercises that changes in the policy regime derived from her work cannot be automatically
represented as unanticipated shocks when studying the potential response of the economy.
6.2 RE2.1: Fully knowledgeable government, model-consistent private sector
Now the analyst can accompany, or inuence, the perceptions and behavior of the private sector,
but would have nothing to contribute to policymaking. Whatever the model at hand tells about
the economy, and about the consequences of alternative policy choices, the government would
possess superior implicit knowledge, including the recognition that the economist can at best
help in making explicit, imperfectly, part of the practical wisdom that G has attained. From
an analytical perspective, as discussed when dealing with RE2.2, the economist working within
the RE2.1 framework must specify the meaning to be assigned to the model-consistency notion,
taking into account as an observed fact that incumbent models do change over time.
8The situation brings memories of the discussion of Tinbergen (1952) where the policymaker determines the
preferences that will decide choices, and the economist supplies to the best of her knowledge the model that maps
tradeo¤s between objectives. The scenario di¤ers from that in Sargent (1999), where the government has been
conducting its learning on the basis of representations misspecied from the contemporaneous point of view of
the analyst.
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7 Concluding remarks
The model currently proposed by an economist is neither the ultimate, as-good-as -can-possibly-
be instrument to generate expectations, nor a timeless object which has been in use already in
the past and will continue in use in the future. Economic theories form part of an ongoing,
individual and collective historical learning process with its ups and downs, comings and goings.
In a self- referential discipline, where the agents who populate the system under study actively
search for ways to understand their environment and predict its evolution, the historicity of
analytical frameworks constitutes one of the observables that the theory should recognize, and
contemplate explicitly when relevant.
We have argued that the usual procedure employed in macroeconomic rational expectations
models implements no clearly dened meaning of the concept. On the one hand, that practice
fails to incorporate the implications of the inferiority of the expectations generated by an econo-
mists model compared with those formed by hypothetical agents with practical command of
the actual laws of motion of the variables. On the other hand, if referring strictly to the model-
consistency notion, the assimilation of the expectations of past, present and future agents with
those based on the presently proposed model places the economist in the position of endowing
the agents whose historical behavior she studies with an understanding of the economy above
that of the relevant economic theory of the times when they were acting, and also above that
of the agents which she once qualied as rational because they followed the now obsolete older-
vintage model.
These problems have practical consequences, especially for the analysis of large-scale uctua-
tions. Macroeconomic crises frustrate plans and expectations on a massive scale. The behaviors
thus invalidated in various historical episodes do not spring merely from psychological exuber-
ance, but in many instances reect sober, considered choices, possibly inuenced, or rationalized,
by established professional pronouncements. As a matter of fact, crises are typically perceived
as a challenge to once prevailing modes of analysis and beliefs about the working on the econ-
omy, and they motivate widespread reconsiderations of theories and opinions. In a way, those
extreme events reect the fallibility of the popularly predominant theories themselves. It would
thus matter that macroeconomic analysis recognizes the evolution of the mental models used by
agents to make anticipations in connection with the process of change of its own representations.
The rational expectations approach meant to take expectations out of the set of variables
which merit a specic analysis, since they would be represented by the economists currently
preferred model. The possible gain in terms of parsimony does not seem to compensate the
losses from ignoring a crucial element in the actual behavior of agents and from leaving out
dynamics of behaviorally relevant beliefs which can have strong macroeconomic impacts.
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